A primary mission for the United States Coast Guard (USCG) operating in coastal United States waters is to interdict contraband. The USCC: schedules a fleet of cutters to meet this mission and seeks a way to determine the operational cfficicncy of a particular schedule. This paper develops a methodology based on generating a sequence of finite horizon dynamic programs (DPs), where each DP differs only in the way the smuggling vessels and the cutters interact. The DP takes the point of view of the smuggler who wishes to develop the smuggling strategy which maximizes some characteristic ( e.g., the mean) of the profit attained. The DP explicitly accounts for a smuggler who must combine his short-run profit goals with his need to gain futiire informntion aboiit the configuration of the cutters. We dcvclop a Monte Carlo sampling procedure to generate estimates of the random variables used in the DP.
INTRODUCTION
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) patrols coastal waters under the United States' jurisdiction. In recent years, this mission has incrcasingly callcd on the USCG to interdict contrahaiid i n the form of illicit drugs and refugees. Accompanied by the Department of Defense, the USCC develops plans for locating cutter patrols in an attempt to interdict smuggling. Each time period, cutters may move from patrol to patrol.
Cutter schedules are typically not adaptive, schedulers plan cutter use more than a quarter-year in advance, striving to meet steaming and patrolling goals. Through satisfaction of these goals the LJSCG attempts to prevent, disrupt, and piinish acts of smiig- gling. An optimization model giiided by a patrolling goal for cach tuple of (patrol, day, ciittcr type) i n its objective function can produce a schetliilr. The Kevin D. Glazebrook
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This paper develops a methodology for doing just this. The method involves generating a sequence of finite horizon dynamic programs (DPs), where each D P differs only in the way the smuggling vessels and the cutters interact. The DP takes the point of view of the smuggler, and the objective is to develop the smuggling strategy which maximizes some characteristic ( e . g . , the mean) of the profit attained. In the future, we will use a higher fidelity model of cutter actions, LESIM (1994) , to generate seizure data. Our goal in the present work is to provide background and structure for the integration of the DP with a simple stochastic seizure model, with an eye toward enhancement in the sequel. Figure 1 summarizes the approach taken in this paper. The DP formulation captures system characteristics we call Realities below. A state of the DP is the relative likelihood that the cutters are configured in certain patrols. The action available from any state is the single time period smuggling strategy pursued. The resulting outcome of a strategy from a state is the new likelihood of a cutter configuration. This likelihood is computed using the information about, scizures, successful smuggling attempts, and a cutter fleet motion model. We use a diverse set of possible multi-period strategies to populate our D P network, where both the single time period profit and the new state depend on the random seizure outcomes.
Upon the successful completion of many iterations of each trial strategy for a time horizon ( T ) , we can produce empirical distributions for the value of being in a particular state and taking a particular action. We can enforce constraints on the stochastic propcrtics of the evolution by removing action/state pairs which violate constraints. For example, we can rliminate actions which cause half of the total contraband shippcd to be confiscated with probability 0.3 or niore. ITinnally, we can test any T-period strate- gy composed of segments of the trial strategies, we can chain backward to maximize expected summed profit, or we can search for strategies which produce desirable quantiles of the value distribution.
Section 2 discusses literature and motivates oiir development. Section 3 describes modeling t,he smuggler's problem as a DP. Section 4 provides a description of Monte Carlo sampling to build a DP network. Section 5 contains conclusions and the Appeiitlis has a summary of notation.
APPROACHES
The pristine smuggler's problem is famous in the Iiteratures of stochastic analysis, sequential decision making and game theory (Owen, 1982) . IIcre are some recent treatments of the smuggler-interdictor problem:
Stationary Shipping
Many models, including the Law Enforcement Simulation (LESIM, 1994) use a simple filtered Poisson process to model the traffic attempted along each route. This model asslimes that the smuggler ignores the presence of the interdictor or any information he might gain by succeeding or failing an attempted shipment. LESIM combines this simple shipping model with a high-fidelity motlcl of thc xlioIis t,nkw by a cutter during patrol, detection, boarding, and seizure.
Gaming
Clearly, smuggling is a game of competing strategies. Esamining this approach, Wood and Washburn (1994) esplore game theoretic methods to calculate strategies which give both sides maximum expected equilibrium benefit. Unfortunately for the Coast Guard, the opponents are not equally facile in adapting as the game is played.
SOAR
The Simulation of Adaptive Response (SOAR) model (Caulkins et al, 1993 ) models the dynamic fluctuations of shipping prices over time, where the smuggler calculates the route with the minimum expected cost a t each time period. The perception of cost is based on shipping expenses and profits, and on perceived probability of seizure. The smuggler's memory of a captured shipment on a route, T , time units in the past fades like e-pT. The smuggler's actual shipping is again a filtered Poisson process, with the splitting probabilities proportional to the perceived costs on each route. SOAR uses static interdiction probabilities on each route, and allows the user to manipulate these to esperiment with interdictor schedules.
The Realities
0 The USCC schedules cutters on a quarterly or yearly basis and does not deviate from this schedule escrpt in times of crisis. Hence the USCG typically does not react to sudden changes in traffic by reallocating cutters.
e The Coast Guard schedules cutters to enter and leave patrol areas by designating an area and duration of stay. This duration is generally between one and sis weeks, and more than one cutter can be assigned to an area simultaneously.
0 The smuggler strives to provide a consistent s u p ply of contraband. For our purposes we assume that the smuggler attempts to deliver a constant amount of contraband in each time period.
0 The smuggler doesn't know the location of the cutters with any certainty, but does get feedback in the form of confiscated shipments. Hence the smuggler is doing two things at once:
1. shipping contraband to accumulate immediate profit;
2. collecting idormation about the location of the cutters so that future decisions are mad e better .
W H A T T H E S M U G G L E R K N O W S , A N D 3.2.2 S c k u r c s Civcn the cutter configuration is dc,. at time t and W H A T H E E S T I M A T E S
an assumption that the cutters detect smugglers independently, the (random) number of seizures Nr(t) on route T is distributed as binomial random variable
We assume a single smuggler who knows many of the cutter scheduling constraints.
IIere we outline what the smuggler knows, and what information he esti-
Smugglcr's Knowlcdgc
We assume that the smuggler has access to the following:
1. the number of ships in the cutter fleet and the locations of the R patrol routes the cutters may 0 ccu py ;
the number of shipments attempted ( s ( t ) = (sl(t),sz(t), . . . ,sn(t)) and confiscated (n(t) = nl(t),nn(t), ..., nn(t)) a t time t ;
3. the maximum and minimum number of cutters allowed to patrol the same route; and 4. the assumed probability that a cutter remains at its current station for the nest time period.
Information Estimatcd
At any time, the smugglcr estimates the state of the cutter fleet expressed as one of the possible configurations of the cutters on the R routes. Denote the number of cutters on route r in configuration c as d,,,
. . , C , where CTd dc>r equals the cutter flcet size and dq. is a specific configuration vector. We use route 0 as the location of cutters which are not on patrol. 
C u t t e r Flcct Motion Model
From the smuggler's point of view, the configuration of the cutters on the routes evolves as a discrete time Markov chain. Given the perceived probability of a cutter changing patrol route for the nest time period, we can calculate the probability P,,,, of transition from configuration d,,. to der,. via complex counting arguments. This matrix estiniatcs the likclihood that the cutters are in a given sequence of configiiratio~is. This model is tempered by the outcomes of smuggling operations to produce the likelihood that the cutters are arranged in a particular configuration in the nest time period.
(1) where p , is the probability of detection of one smuggling vessel by one cutter on route T .
Likclihood U p d a t e s
In the smuggler's view, the configuration of cutters on the routes at time t is a random variable D(t). The smuggler's goal is to control the flow of contraband through the system to meet delivery goals by exploiting his estimate 4 and by manipulating s(t).
Dynamic P r o g r a m m i n g
The above updating process lends itself directly to sequcntial optimization for a finite time horizon with T as the planning horizon for smuggling operations. Let C'1 be the immediate cost of an interdicted shipment, including lost equipment, legal fees, and the shipment itself. Let (22 be the immediate profit realized from a completed delivery. The (random) value of occupying state d(t) at time t and using future strategy 
E[V(&IO,T)]
We can solve (6) using backward recursion to produce an optimal strategy, (s(l), s(2), . . . , s@)), with maximum expected profit. In what follows, we explore the use of Monte Carlo methods for exploring the behavior of (5) when the goal is other than maximizing summed expected profit.
MONTE CARLO METHODS
In order to get a stochastic characterization of the possible smuggler operations, we generate a sequence of random outcomes of seizures under different smuggling strategies. We use these outcomes to populate the arc lengths on a network connecting DP states to one another. We then exploit methods for essmining the behavior of networks with stochastic arc lengths to characterize the capabilities and tendencics of the smuggler.
Building the Dynamic Programming
Let sl, s2,. . . , sz be a set of strategies for trial, $ ( t )
being the number of shipments on route r a t time period t for strategy i. We will select these strategies so that they reflect methods that will likely be successful, and ,so that they represent a diverse set of choices. 
Measuring Performance and Constructing Strategies
Thus, we can now produce an empirical distribution of the value of pursuing any strategy which is a combination of segments of the s1,s2,. . . ,d.
Optimizing Summed Profit
To collect samples of the optimal summed profit for the T tirnc units, we select the strategy s ( t ) ; at each stage which optimizes % (&'lo,t) for each 4'. The optimal strategy is found by chaining backward from
vk(&'Io,T):
Vk(&'IS, t ) =
6(&(t),t)k + Vk(i'($'lS(t),t + l ) k l S ( t ) , t + 1) ( 8 )
Where Vk($l(&ls(t),t This is because the maximization is taken after the randomness has been realized, rather than before. This result mimics many which show how network optimization routines used with expected arc lengths stray from the results produced when the network optimization is done after each arc has realized it length. The obvious similarity stems from the link between dynamic programming and network shortest (or longest) paths, see Bailey (1994) for several examples.
In the smuggler problem, the distinction betwcen optimization before or after realization relates the distance between the formulation of the sm~iggling policy and the feedback the smuggler receives during operations. Before realization, using (6), corresponds to the smuggler planning all of his operations strategically a setting his plan before the 5" time Units begin. Optimization post-realization corresponds t o the smuggler having a crgstal ball, and knowing what seizures he will realize if he follows a particular strategy. As reality lies bctwcen these two estremes, the post-realization answer givcs the smuggler an upper bound on his performance, while providing the USCG with a lower bound on the performance of a cutter schedule.
4.2.2
Maximizing a Q u a n t i l e Using a low quantile corresponds to the smuggler being risk averse. The smuggler might want to masimize his worst-case profit, where worst c a x is intcrpreted as a profit he is (1 -a)% sure of receiving. On the other hand, he may wish to look for policies which have high large quantiles, giving himself the chance to make a possible windfall with great risk.
The search among the possible strategies for those which procluce a high ath quantile is clearly problematic. One heuristic would be t o maximize the quantile at each stage. Such an approach has the added benefit of minimizing the USCG's ability to disrupt short-term supply.
Avoiding Disruption of Short-Term Supply
In most real supplier-consumer relationships, the supplier must satisfy target delivery levels and meet short-run cash flow constraints during the evolution. Also, he seeks to maximize his total profit. Suppose that we thinned the 
Smuggler Tendencies and R e a c t i o n s
Using the table of outcomes and the I< x T optimal single time period strategies, we c8n calculate the following quantities directly:
e the frequency that a single time period strategy is optimal; 0 the distribution of the distance (measured in some way) between the likelihood configuration and the true cutter configuration; e the smuggler's cost of reducing T , the planning horizon;
e the distribution of the number of time periods the smuggler takes to realize that the cutter configuration does not cover a particular route; and e the distribution of the number of time periods the smuggler takes to react t o drastically increased coverage of a route.
CONCLUSION
Some previous attempts a t modeling the interaction of the smugglers and the USCG patrol schedule give too much flexibility to the cutter schedule to be realistic. Other approaches don't model the cutter schedule appropriately, so the smuggler's strategies are too simplistic. In this work, we have formulated a dynamic program where the smuggler is forced to combine his short-run profit goals with his need to gain future information about the configuration of the cutters. Using Monte Carlo methods, we have developed a scheme to estimate stochastic properties of the smuggler's performance using a particular schedule, and shown how constraints on the smuggler's short-run performance can be enforced. 
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